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I
THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE CERTIFICATION ORDER IS WHETHER
THERE ARE SEPARATE STANDARDS FOR WAIVER BY
SILENCE AND WAIVER BY ACTION, NOT
WHETHER THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO FIND THAT
DESERET FEDERAL WAIVED THE COMPLETION DATE,
A.

United Pacific and Tri-K Have Inappropriately Responded to
the Certification Order as Though It Were an Opportunity to
Appeal the Judgment,
Two parties have filed blue covered briefs - United

Pacific Insurance Company ("United Pacific") and Tri-K Contractors ("Tri-K").-

This reply brief will respond to both of their

opening briefs.
Judge Jenkins has asked for a clarification on the
standard under Utah law for proving waiver.

He has asked specif-

ically whether a different standard applies depending on whether
waiver is alleged from a party's action or conduct, or a party's
inaction or silence.

Instead of properly focusing on these ques-

tions, United Pacific and Tri-K have argued at great length that
there was ample evidence that Deseret Federal had waived Tri-Kfs
completion date for building the condominium project.

Tri-K even

asked for the Court to find error on the part of the trial court.

1/

Because these questions of law were certified by the Chief
Judge of the United States District Court, sua sponte, neither party is the appellant as such. Rather, they are in
the position of cross-petitioners, each entitled to file
reply briefs and to reserve time for rebuttal at oral argument. Letter from Geoffrey Butler dated April 27, 1992.

-1-

These arguments should be reserved for the United States District
Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
pose here.

They serve no pur-

The focus here should be limited to the narrow issues

of law raised by the certification order.
B.

While They Claim to be in Agreement, United Pacific and
Tri-K Have Taken Contrary Positions on Hunter v. Hunter and
its Three Prong Standard for Waiver,
Tri-K states in its opening brief at 15 that it joins

in the argument of United Pacific which it claims extensively
reviewed the Utah case law on waiver and the standards applicable
to determine waiver.

Yet, Tri-K argues in its two pages of anal-

ysis that the standard for proving waiver as outlined in Hunter
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), has been overruled by Morgan
v. Quailbrook, 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985), and Parks v. Zions First
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983).- /
16-17.

See Tri-K Brief at

While this is consistent with the initial position taken

by United Pacific in the trial court, it is very different than
United Pacific's current analysis of the case law.—3/

1'

This point is hardly worth addressing. Morgan v.
Quailbrook. 704 P.2d at 578, cites Hunter with approval.

2/

In support of its post trial motions, United Pacific vehemently contended that Hunter had been overruled even though
it argues now that Hunter sets forth the correct principles
to make a factual finding where the relinquishment of a
known right occurs as a result of a party's silence. See

Footnote continued on next page.

-2-

United Pacific's response to the certified questions of
law was that the "inconsistent with any other intent" prong has
been applied only in those cases involving waiver by silence,
hence, under Utah law there is a separate standard for waiver by
4/
silence.United Pacific tried to find a different standard of
proof where the expression is silence rather than words so that
it could peg the present case as one which only requires proof
that Deseret Federal's conduct was distinct and unequivocal, but
not necessarily inconsistent with any other intent.

In order to

force this result, United Pacific inaccurately portrayed the
facts in the waiver decisions of this Court.
As the RTC has explained in its opening brief, a distinction between the proof necessary for implied waiver by
silence versus implied waiver by action is improper.

As this

Footnote continued from previous page.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by United
Pacific in support of its Motion for Post Trial Relief at
15. United Pacific initially filed this Memorandum with the
Third District Court, and then re-filed it with the federal
court, Docket No. 63.
4/

United Pacific referred to the waiving party's intent as
being distinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other
intent. It is, however, the conduct evincing that intent
which must be inconsistent with any other interest. Hunter
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432; Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279
(Wash. 1980).

-3-
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constituting waiver did not mean that the alleged waiver was
based on Mrs, Hunter's silence.

It merely meant that Mr. Hunter

was unable to prove his case.
Having distinguished Hunter as a case involving waiver
by silence, United Pacific then forced the subsequent case law
into either a silence or action classification based on the definition of waiver recited in the opinion, regardless of whether
the facts actually justified the classification.
United Pacific also mischaracterized Anqelos v. First
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983), as a silence or inaction case because the court used the Hunter language and held
that any action or conduct constituting waiver was missing.

Cer-

tainly the absence of conduct which expresses an intent to relinquish a known right does not mean a fortiori that the waiver must
be found in a parties' inaction.

Anqelos was an implied, rather

than express, waiver case, but it was not a waiver by silence
case.

Once again, this Court stated:

"To constitute waiver,

one's actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent with any other intent."

(Emphasis added.)

671 P.2d at 776.

United Pacific analyzed Parks v. Zions First National
Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983), as a case of waiver by action
ostensibly because it lacked the three part (distinct,
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1990), as a waiver by silence case, although United Pacific
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shares a different view.

The Court defined waiver as the inten-

tional relinquishment of a known right and then added, "Mere
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation
to speak" [citing Dalton v. LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th
Cir. 1965)].

802 P.2d at 730.

United Pacific also mischaracterized Rees v.
Intermountain Health Care, 808 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1991), as supporting its thesis that waiver by silence requires different proof
than waiver by action.

Dr. Rees had submitted jury instructions

based on the language in Clark v. American Concept Ins. Co.y 758
P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and B. R. Woodward Marketing
Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

In the latter case, the Court of Appeals stated that

the pivotal issue was whether Woodward intended to relinquish his
rights or, more precisely, whether Woodward's conduct unequivocally evinced an intent to waive or at least was inconsistent
with any other intent.

Id. at 102.

B. R. Woodward and the case

upon which it relied appear to have been based on the incorrect
rationale that the waiving party1s subjective intent for the
relinquishment is largely irrelevant.-

The Court of Appeals

held that whether waiver will be found in any particular case

£/

See Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-7-

d e p e n d s not upon the secret Intention of the party against whom,,
it is a s s e r t e d , but upon, the effect. *r. k_
11 ie ot her par I: j ,

r*d„,, -

.1-

.L
}

Se e , B j* Woodv -. - ;*._.> *.<i' . .

Tl lis c o n c l u s i o n , relying on, a s tat erne:1.pel and W a i v e r , S 158 at 843 (1,966
tence i i i

:., s

*

* 3

AJII

.

.

, _:. E s t o p -

;r res •-e "*- / "-*•

* la, read,i i: i,,g

waiver

is .> ...tenoc*. -r o n e pai t„y and so understood, and a c c e p t e d

by t h e

otr>^"' H e e5

Nn

4.

I n t e rniuun t a i n Hea 11 n Ca r t:,

1111 |

i 11 :i i i 11' 1 i \\

9, referr incj to waiver g e n e r a l l y , contained the d i s t i n c t ,

u n e q u i v o c a l and inconsistent with any other intent
r. .inter v , Huntei •
L e c a u s e of D r . Rees 1

J

/ ins* > i ,f " >" \\ >

' , i " <-. > in |

«

- "

s i l e n c e , (.untamed the te rnu nology t r oin the

court of A p p e a l s d e c i s i o n s ,
implies a different

language from

I'M Judge J e n k i n s , this a p p a r e n t l y

I nnliinl l m

^HM'IM

il I • ', i I

IP

i m ij

II ipped! 1

h o w e v e r , tnai; on appeal neithei ui the pai'ties in Rees f nor this
C o u r t , p l a c e d any particular emphasis nn the way the "inconsistent with any other1 iritprit™ 1 i"iiif)iia<|e ^tv^ phrased

in t lie t * |nny

As the R T C h a s p o i n t e d out . . .-i 1--^
c L . . e: : / r* ,:.fr
to w a i v e a right c a n be c o n s t r u c t i v e , rather than actual
w h e r e the conduct which implies a waiver is of such a n a t u r e
as to m i s l e a d the opposi*.- ; a: - . :: r an icnest belief that
the w a i v e r w a s intended cr asser*ed * o . This conduct must
at least b e inconsistent wit*-, any otner intent, 32 C . J . S .
at 1 0 6 0 . T h i s threshold requirement w a s not me- -.ere w h e r e
the jury answered "no" * i r r e;. i interrogatory
'-.
-8

!

instructions.

Intermountain Health Care conceded in its appel-

lant's brief that express waiver requires evidence of conduct
which is distinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other
intent (the language used in jury instruction No. 10, the waiver
8/
by silence instruction).In view of this concession, the Court
held that silence requires an identical standard.
at 1075.

Rees, 808 P.2d

Rees does not stand for the proposition that a differ-

ent standard of proof applies to cases involving waiver by
silence.

It supports the notion that implied waiver, whether by

action or silence, requires proof that the conduct was distinct,
unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent.
The RTC submits that the standard of proof for implied
waiver by silence is no different than the standard of proof for
implied waiver by words or action.

This position is entirely

consistent with the case law and the underlying principle that
the intention of the party holding a right that has supposedly
been relinquished is crucial.

By definition, waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right.

There is no waiver

unless the waiver is so intended by one party and so understood
and accepted by the other.

28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver,

It would have been more accurate for Intermountain Health
Care to concede that waiver which is implied from words and
action requires certain proof without referring to express
waiver which was not an issue.

-9-

S 158 at 843.

Whether the relinquishment is by affirmative con-

duct or by silence, it must be inconsistent with any other
intent.
II
WHEN THE COURT ADDRESSES THE THIRD QUESTION
CERTIFIED BY JUDGE JENKINS, THE FOCUS SHOULD BE
ON SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES NOS. 22-24 AND
WHETHER THEY PROPERLY STATED THE LAW.
United Pacific and Tri-K made reference to an excessive
number of special interrogatories attempting to demonstrate that
Deseret Federal did waive its rights to have Tri-K complete the
project by December 31, 1984.

In doing so, they confused the

contractual relationships between the parties.

It is important

to understand that there were two contracts at issue when this
case went to trial.

The first was a Construction Loan Agreement

between Soters, Inc., and Deseret Federal.
Tri-K was never a party to this contract.

Trial Exhibit 1.
Under this agreement,

entered into as of April 4, 1984, Soters and Deseret Federal
agreed that the project would be completed by April 4, 1985, and
that Soters would re-pay its construction loan on that date.

As

that date approached, with the loan out of balance and the
project far from completion, Deseret Federal, hopeful that Soters
would bring the loan back into balance and that Tri-K would complete the project, agreed to extend the re-payment date from
-10-

April 4, 1985 to October 5, 1985, as it was permitted to do under
paragraph 4.3 of the Construction Loan Agreement.

This conces-

sion to Soters had nothing to do with Tri-K.
After being instructed, the jury was presented with 52
special interrogatories.

Of these interrogatories, Nos. 6-8,

patterned after jury instruction No. 18 and the three part standard for waiver in Hunter v. Hunter, asked whether Soters had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Deseret Federal
had waived the completion date which bound Soters, Inc., under
the Construction Loan Agreement.

This issue was critical to a

determination as to whether Deseret Federal had cause to cease
funding the loan.

The jury answered that there had been a waiver

of Soters1 completion date by answering yes, that the evidence of
the intent to relinquish a known right was distinct (interrogatory No. 6), unequivocal (interrogatory No. 7), and inconsistent
with any other intent (interrogatory No. 8). The jury ultimately
found Soters in breach of the Construction Loan Agreement for
other reasons.

See Findings of Fact, No. 47 at 12.

Special

interrogatories Nos. 6-8, the Construction Loan Agreement, and
any other issues between Soters, Inc. and Deseret Federal have
been resolved by a post trial settlement agreement and have nothing to do with United Pacific or Tri-K.
focus of the certification order.
-11-

They are clearly not the

See Certification Order at 8.

The second agreement at issue during the trial was an
AIA Standard Form Construction Contract entered into between
Soters, Inc., and Tri-K.

Trial Exhibit 4001.

Soters assigned

this contract, with Tri-K's express consent, to Deseret Federal
as additional security for the loan.

When Deseret Federal

entered the picture in April 1984, construction of the Camelot
condominiums was well under way funded by Zions Bank.

Knudsen

had been a maker of the initial promissory note to Zions Bank and
was involved in the project for a piece of the action.

Testimony

of Sherwin Knudsen, RT. 57:21-59:5, 159:4-23, 5/13/88; Trial
Exhibit No. 60; Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT. 190:12-14,
5/12/88.

Before Deseret Federal would fund the construction

loan, it insisted on a typed construction contract between Soters
and Tri-K.

Sherwin Knudsen had attorney Stanley Stoll prepare

the document.

When they got to the section where a completion

date needed to be filled in Stoll asked Knudsen what date Knudsen
felt comfortable with.

Knudsen specified December 31, 1984.

After questioning Knudsen to make sure he could complete by that
date, Stoll entered the date in the blank provided.
Stanley Stoll RT. 157:20-158:10, 5/12/88.

Testimony of

There were several

prior handwritten versions of this construction contract that
specified a completion date of "in a timely manner."

The jury

determined that Trial Exhibit 4001, the typed version of the
-12-

agreement prepared by Stoll, dated April 15, 1984, with a stated
project completion date of December 31, 1984, was the binding
operative contract.

See jury's answer to special interrogatory

No. 18 included in Tab 6 to United Pacific's bound addendum.
This construction agreement was the document that bound
Tri-K to substantially complete by December 31, 1984.

This date

chosen by Tri-K was unrelated to the obligation of Soters Inc. to
complete the project by April 4, 1985.

It is the breach of this

construction agreement that triggered United Pacific's duties
under its performance bond.
Special interrogatory Nos. 22-24 related to Tri-K's
performance of its construction agreement and asked the jury to
decide if Deseret Federal had waived its right to demand timely
completion of the project.

Special interrogatories 48-50

addressed the identical issue, but with respect to United Pacific's obligation based on Tri-K's breach.
Interrogatory Nos. 22-24 and 48-50 were not identical,
although they should have been.

Counsel for Deseret Federal

properly objected specifically to No. 50 because it was not
framed in the same terms as No. 24 and was simply a reiteration

-13-

of the principles questioned in Nos. 48 and 49.-

Moreover, Nos.

48-50 did not comport with jury instruction No. 18 as did Nos.
22-24.

Judge Baldwin recognized this fact after the special

interrogatories had been answered and concluded that Nos. 48-50
should have been worded the same as Nos. 22-24, and that had Nos.
48-50 conformed to Nos. 22-24, the jury's answers to Nos. 48-50
would have been the same as their answers to Nos. 22-24.—
United Pacific's ultimate objection throughout its post-trial
motions and argument before Judge Jenkins has been that No. 24 is

z/

"With respect to Interrogatories 48, 49 and 50, Deseret Federal objects on several bases: One, that those interrogatories are duplicitous of other interrogatories dealing with
Sherwin Knudsen earlier, and those issues were covered earlier and need not be covered here. And in addition, Deseret
Federal objects to Interrogatory No. 50 because it does not
set out the correct elements of waiver, particularly the
element that a waiver must not be inconsistent with any
other intent." (RT, Objections to Jury Interrogatories and
Special Verdict, 27:6-15, 5/26/88.)

iH/

Finding of Fact No. 61 at p. 17, included in appendix to
RTC's red brief.
United Pacific was critical of Judge Baldwin's conduct
accusing him of entering Findings of Facts which overturned
the jury verdict. Judge Baldwin took nearly eleven months
after the jury returned its special verdict attempting to
reconcile the jury's answers to 52 special interrogatories
before entering the judgment. His efforts should be
applauded. He made sense out of inconsistent answers and
entered judgment exactly as he was supposed to do. See 9
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, S 2510
(1971); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir.
1985).
-14-

superfluous.

Therefore, interrogatory Nos. 22-24 and jury

instruction No. 18 should be, and in fact are, the focus of Judge
Jenkins1 certification order.

See Certification Order at 8.

Despite its claim to the contrary, neither United
Pacific nor Tri-K objected to these special interrogatories or to
jury instruction No. 1 8 . — T h i s

failure in and of itself is

usually fatal to any post-trial challenge of the jury instructions.

See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 184 Ut. Adv. Rep.

14, 15 (Utah, April 2, 1992); Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium
Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985).

Judge Jenkins has neverthe-

less asked for a clarification of the law.

11/

When United Pacific's attorney was asked whether he had any
objections, he answered, "I have no objections then."
Tri-K's attorney then had an opportunity to object. He
failed to state any reason why he took exception to instruction No. 18. His statement was, "We have a waiver instruction in there, Your Honor. We would have liked that one
given." His only objection to the form of the special
interrogatories was that they should simply have asked
whether there had been a waiver, without going through the
different elements of proof. No objection was made, however, that the special interrogatories dealing with waiver
did not comport with the law. See RT, Objections to Jury
Interrogatories and Special Verdict, 20:15-22:25, 5/26/88.
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Ill
DESERET FEDERAL TRIED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES.
THIS WAS NOT A WAIVER OF ITS RIGHTS.
At trial, Deseret Federal elicited testimony from Ronald Frandsen, Major Loan Department Manager for Deseret Federal,
and David Redd, Deseret Federal's attorney, as well as Sherwin
Knudsen of Tri-K and Stanley Stoll, attorney for Soters Inc.,
concerning certain workout meetings that took place in February
and April 1985.

It is from these meetings and the events that

transpired in the spring of 1985, after Tri-K had failed to substantially complete by December 31, 1984, that United Pacific and
Tri-K have alleged waiver.

There was no evidence, and in fact

United Pacific and Tri-K have never argued that there was any
conduct on the part of Deseret Federal prior to December 31,
which was so inconsistent with an intention to hold Tri-K to its
completion date, and which mislead Sherwin Knudsen into an honest
belief that the completion date had been waived.
Each of these witnesses testified that Deseret Federal
had made it clear to Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen that the balance of the construction loan was insufficient to complete the
project and that Tri-K would not be paid beyond December 31,
1984.

It was obvious that the project had not been substantially

completed on time and no one needed to re-state the obvious.
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At

these meetings, Deseret Federal attempted to mitigate its damages
and encouraged Knudsen to stay on the job and get the project
built,

Deseret Federal did not, however, relinquish its rights

under the construction agreement.
Of the first workout meeting in February 1985, at which
Stanley Stoll, David Redd, Ron Frandsen, Steven Anderson, Greg
Soter and Sherwin Knudsen were present, Mr. Stoll testified:
Q

Was anything said in response to that
about whether or not Sherwin Knudsen
should continue to work?

A

Yes, both Dave Redd and I agreed, particularly, that it was in the best
interest of all concerned to finish the
project.

And therefore whatever mecha-

nism was utilized to work through the
impasse that existed at that point in
time, that it was best to keep the people on the job.

I made the statement,

particularly to Mr. Redd, that, "Look,
the project will cost what the project
is going to cost."

That may sound like

a fair rhetorical statement, but it was
my point that we had contractors on the
-17-

job.

Mr. Knudsen had just reaffirmed

and had committed his subcontractors to
reaffirm.
RT. 32:24-33:12, 5/12/88.
Of the second meeting that occurred later in February
1985, Mr. Stoll testified:
Q

Was there any discussion at this second
meeting about whether or not Tri-K
should keep working?

A

I stated again, as I had in the first
meeting, that it was our position that
it was in the best interest of all parties to continue constructing the
project, to complete the project.

Id. 50:13-18.
United Pacific stated that during these workout meetings in the spring of 1985, no one ever said that Tri-K was in
breach of its construction contract.

United Pacific failed to

point out that no one from Deseret Federal ever said that Deseret
Federal did not expect Tri-K to adhere to its completion date, or
that Deseret Federal was waiving its rights under the construction agreement to have the project completed by December 31,
1984.

These facts bear on whether the jury could as easily have
-18-

been looking for an expression of waiver by silence as waiver by
words or action.

See Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT.

156:14-158:11, 5/19/88; testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT.
26:12-34:22, 5/12/88.
The testimony of Soters* attorney Stan Stoll, and Ron
Frandsen of Deseret Federal, puts the workout meetings into their
proper context.

The purpose of the 1985 meetings between Deseret

Federal, Sherwin Knudsen, Greg Soter and their attorneys was to
confront Greg Soter and Knudsen with the problem that the loan
was out of balance and the project was not finished.

Greg Soter

was told that if he didn't put money into the pot to bring the
loan back into balance, Deseret Federal would not make any further loan disbursements.

Knudsen admitted at trial that he was

fully aware of the situation and of Deseret Federal's position.
Testimony of Sherwin Knudsen, RT. 77, 5/16/88.
Furthermore, Stan Stollfs testimony points to the
efforts Deseret Federal was taking in the spring of 1985 to try
and work out the problems with Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen.
This effort to mitigate its damages is obviously the "other
intent" that the jury was referring to when it answered special
interrogatory No. 24.

See Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT.

25:20-34:22, 5/12/88.
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After it became apparent that any further efforts to
mitigate were useless, Deseret Federal gave written notice to
United Pacific, in June 1985, of its obligation to step in and
complete the project.

Trial Exhibit 91.

United Pacific elected

to completely ignore the demand and by the time this case went to
trial the unfinished condominiums had spent three winters deteriorating under the elements.

Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT.

160:8-161:6, 5/19/88.
United Pacific and Tri-K referred to the trial testimony of a Deseret Federal employee, Steven Anderson, who testified that he knew in September 1984, that the project would not
be completed until the end of 1985.

See RT. 112, 5/19/88.

This

testimony about Mr. Anderson's belief in 1984 cannot support
United Pacific's contention that in the spring of 1985 Deseret
Federal unequivocally expressed an intention to relinquish its
right to a timely completion of the condominiums.

Perhaps more

importantly, there was no evidence that Mr. Anderson's belief
mislead Knudsen to believe that the completion date had been
waived.
In fact, it appeared that Steven Anderson made a typographical error on the September 1984 Loan Disbursement Authorization and typed the project completion date as 12-85, meaning
December 1985, instead of the correct date of 12-84, that he
-20-

later typed on the subsequent October 1984 Loan Disbursement
Authorization form.

When Anderson took the stand at trial, he

tried to cover his blunder by claiming the project was not to be
completed until somewhere around year end of 1985 or before,
Anderson testified he discussed this with Ron Frandsen, Major
Loan Department Manager for Deseret Federal.

When Frandsen took

the stand, however, he testified that he met with Greg Soter,
Sherwin Knudsen, Soters' attorney Stanley Stoll, and Steve
Anderson at attorney David Redd's office in February 1985, and
that there was a discussion as to whether the project was on
schedule.

Frandsen was concerned because Soters and Tri-K were

missing the prime marketing season and the project was not completed as required by the contract.

At that time, Frandsen

learned for the first time that Knudsen expected a fall 1985 completion.

Testimony of Ronald Frandsen, RT. 156:14-159:17,

5/19/88.
United Pacific and Tri-K inferred that because Deseret
Federal paid Tri-K in February 1985, for its December 1984 draw
request, that this was a manifestation of Deseret Federal's
waiver of the December 31, 1984 completion date.

This argument

is entirely disingenuous in view of United Pacific's attorney's
statement to the jury that payment for the December work was a
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condition precedent to enforcement of its bond.

RT. Opening

Statements 27:19-28:11, 5/11/88.
CONCLUSION
The focus of the briefing and eventual argument before
this Court should be on the questions posed by Judge Jenkins in
his certification order.

When these questions are answered and

the points he has raised are clarified, Judge Jenkins can then
rule on the parties' motions for post trial relief.
The RTC urges the Court to adopt the analysis of the
law of waiver set out in its opening brief.

It is undisputed

that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right
and that the relinquishment may be express or implied.

Because

the "intent" of the party holding the right is the core of this
legal principle, the required proof of the expression of that
intent which is set out in Hunter v. Hunter is correct.

Any

lesser standard improperly shifts the focus from the intent of
the party holding the right to the perceptions of others around
him.

The importance of asking the "inconsistent with any other

intent" question was illustrated by Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Company, 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).

Moreover, no lesser

standard should apply to cases involving waiver by silence.

Rees

v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).
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